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Airlines

Name: AJET AIRWAYS
7JetSet7 Code: HCY
Status: Operational
Region: EUROPE
City: LARNACA
Country: CYPRUS
Employees 118
Web: ajet.com
Email: info@ajet.com
Telephone: +357 24 815 700
Fax: +357 24 815 701
Sita: LCAOOZU
Background
(definitions)

Click below for data links:
HCY-ACCDT-AUG05
HCY-ACCDT-AUG05-A
HCY-ACCDT-AUG05-B
HCY-ACCDT-AUG05-C
HCY-ACCDT-AUG05-D
HCY-ACCDT-AUG05-E
HCY-ACCDT-AUG05-F
HCY-JAN05
HCY-JAN06-A
HCY-MAP
HCY-NOV04
HCY-OCT04-A

STARTED OPERATIONS IN 2000. FORMERLY HELIOS AIRWAYS. SCHEDULED & CHARTER, DOMESTIC & INTERNATIONAL, PASSENGER, JET AIRPLANE SERVICES.

ADDRESS:
RIA COURT NO 9, 1ST FLOOR
NIETSCHE STREET 22
PO BOX 43028, LARNACA AIRPORT
CY-6028 LARNACA, CYPRUS

CYPRUS WAS ESTABLISHED IN 1960, COVERS AN AREA OF 5,896 SQ KM, AND ITS POPULATION IS 0.6 MILLION. THE CAPITAL CITY IS NICOSIA AND THE OFFICIAL LANGUAGE IS GREEK.

FEBRUARY 2000: FORMED BY THE OWNERS OF TEA (CYPRUS) LTD (A CYPRIOT OFF-SHORE AIR OPERATOR SPECIALIZING IN 737 AIRPLANE LEASES WORLDWIDE).

PASSENGER CHARTERS FROM LANARCA AND PAPHOS.

HQ IN SWITZERLAND. AIRPLANE MAINTENANCE IN CYPRUS.

1 ORDER (JUNE 2000) 737-4Y0, EX-FUTURA (FUA) GECAS (GEH) LEASED. 2 ORDERS (MARCH 2001) 737-86N'S, (GEH) LEASED.

MARCH 2000: IN JUNE 2000, LARNACA - BERGAMO/VERONA CHARTER FLIGHTS.

MAY 2000: CHARTER OPERATIONS TO LONDON GATWICK (LGW).

December 2003: Larnaca (LCA) - London Luton (LUT).

Both 737-86N's successfully completed their "C" checks at ATC Lasham (ATK).

1 order (April 2004) 737-86N.

APRIL 2000: 90 EMPLOYEES (INCLUDING 21 FLIGHT CREW (FC), 50 CABIN ATTENDANTS (CA), & 6 MAINTENANCE TECHNICIANS (MT)).

(http://www.helios-airways.com). (helios@air.com.cy).

JUNE 2000: 737-4YO (1824-24682, /90 24 21 5-DBG), (GEH) LEASED TO START CHARTER OPERATIONS AT LARNACA.

NOVEMBER 2000: SHAUN DEWEY, MANAGING DIRECTOR, REPLACES MARKUS SEILER, WHO RESIGNED.

MARCH 2001: IN SUMMER, CHARTER SERVICE, LARNACA - MILAN (MALPENSA), & LARNACA - BOLOGNA - VERONA (WEEKLY). SCHEDULED SERVICE TO BELFAST, DUBLIN, AND SOFIA (WEEKLY).

1ST 737-86N DELIVERY (30806).

APRIL 2001: 90 EMPLOYEES (INCL 21 FLIGHT CREW (FC), 15 CABIN ATTENDANTS (CA), & 81 MAINTENANCE TECHNICIANS (MT)).

SCHEDULED SERVICE, LARNACA TO SOFIA.

2ND 737-8YO (30807, 5B-DBI), (GEF) LEASED.

AUGUST 2001: 115 EMPLOYEES.

(info@helios-airways.com).

SEPTEMBER 2001: KYRIACOS PILAVAKIS, TECHNICAL MANAGER, EX-EUROCYPRIA (ECY) REPLACES BRAHIM NAJI.

NOVEMBER 2001: FOR SUMMER SEASON 2002, FROM LARNACA, TO ABERDEEN, AND LIVERPOOL.

DECEMBER 2001: 737-800 "C" MAINTENANCE CHECK, AT ATC LASHAM (ATK).

JANUARY 2002: IN MARCH 2002, LARNACA TO DUBLIN (2/WEEK).

FEBRUARY 2002: CHARTER FLIGHTS TO CAIRO AND LUXOR.

April 2002: 118 employees (including 24 Flight Crew (FC; 60 Cabin Attendants (CA); & 8 Maintenance Technicians (MT)).

Main Base: Larnaca International airport (LCA).

Hub: Paphos International airport (PFO).

November 2002: To Luton (LUT) (3/week). This is a very popular route, especially from the UK side. Other popular runs are to Dublin, and Sofia.

Completed a successful (JAA) audit of Flight Operations.

737-800 "C" checks at ATC Lasham (ATK).

December 2002: Larnaca to Luton (5/week). In January 2003, scheduled service to Belfast, Glasgow, and Newcastle.

Plans to add 1 or 2 more 737-800's in 2004.

SITA: LCAOOZU.

July 2003: 115 employees.

In November 2003, Birmingham - Paphos (737-800, weekly).

October 2003: Paphos - London (LTN) (weekly), Larnaca - London (STN) (weekly). In November 2003, Paphos - London Gatwick (LGW) (2/week), Paphos - Manchester (2/week).

March 2004: Larnaca - London Heathrow (LHR) (737-300, 5/week).

April 2004: In May 2004, code share with Aegean (CRM), Athens - Larnaca (3/day).

118 employees (including 24 Flight Crew (FC), 60 Cabin Attendants (CA), & 8 Maintenance Technicians (MT)).

1 737-31S (29099), ex-Deutsche BA (DBA), Deutsche Structured Finance leased.

May 2004: Larnaca - Thessaloniki. Resumes Larnaca - Paphos - Dublin (weekly) & Paphos - Manchester (weekly). Larnaca - Irakleion (weekly). Larnaca - Dublin.

October 2004: Has been sold to the Libra Holidays Group (LHG) who plan to transform the company into a low-cost, low-fare scheduled airline serving Cyprus, and the eastern Mediterranean from Europe, including the UK, France, and Poland. Libra Holidays previously held a 30% stake in Excel Airways (SBE).

November 2004: In December 2004, Larnaca - Birmingham (weekly).

August 2005: ACCDT: (HCY) 737-31S (2982-29099, 5B-DBY), crashed into a wooded hillside near Grammatiko, Greece. Both pilots (FC) appeared incapacitated, as observed by 2 F-16's who also noticed that oxygen masks had deployed in the main cabin, suggesting a loss of cabin pressure = all 121 fatalities. Maintenance reports were previously made that this airplane experienced a loss of cabin pressure back in December 2004.

All 121 people on board were killed when the airplane ran out of fuel and crashed near Athens. Greek accident investigators are trying to understand what occurred aboard the doomed plane to leave the pilot (FC) and copilot (FC) unconscious as a male flight attendant (CA) with a few hours of training in light airplanes tried to fly the jet, reportedly while using a portable emergency oxygen system to stay conscious. Investigators have determined that the flight crew (FC) were already unconscious and the cabin altitude alert in the cockpit was activated as the airplane climbed through 14,000 ft. The Flight Data Recorder (FDR) has been recovered and analyzed but the Cockpit Data Recorder (CVR) has not been located, only the container. Cyprus President, Tassos Papadopolos said in a statement that his administration will take "full responsibility" if investigators find that Cypriot aviation authorities were at fault. A source in the civil service criticized the civil aviation department, claiming that in-flight checks had not been carried out for months. Cypriot authorities say they are in full compliance with international safety regulations and have rejected opposition calls for an independent inquiry into the crash.

This August 14 crash of a Helios Air (HCY) 737-300 occurred owing to a series of errors and miscues that will likely have human factors experts studying it for years. According to a report in the "International Herald Tribune" that cites several people "connected with the investigation," the problem began during an overnight maintenance check in which a technician apparently left a "pressurization controller rotary knob" out of place. The cockpit crew (FC) did not discover the mistake during their pre-flight check and the cabin failed to pressurize after takeoff. The pilots (FC) heard but did not respond correctly to the audible cabin pressure warning alarm as the airplane climbed through 10,000 ft/3,000 m because the same horn sounds on the ground if the airplane is not configured properly for takeoff and the crew became confused. Furthermore, they could not communicate well because the captain (FC), a German national did not speak Greek well and the Cypriot copilot (FC), who was characterized in the report as "young and inexperienced" did not speak German fluently "and each had difficulty understanding how the other spoke English." Then, as the airplane reached 14,000 ft, causing oxygen masks to deploy in the cabin, the captain (FC) became preoccupied with an unrelated alarm and neither pilot (FC) apparently realized what was happening, owing at least in part to growing disorientation caused by lack of oxygen. Eventually both became incapacitated. The airplane continued on autopilot until it ran out of fuel and crashed.

The following text comes from emails sent between some pilots (FC) who sent the attached comments to each other. The text has been included here as it is interesting although it is the opinion of the writers only and does not reflect any official finding. Still, it is very interesting:

The emails:

"Got this from a friend, thought it interesting. Included are some shots of the F-16s that went up to see what was going on. Sad to think that when the pictures were taken all on the plane were either already dead, or about to be." - - SEE ATTACHED PHOTOS - - "HCY-ACCDT-2005-08-A/B/C/D/E."

"I just cannot believe 2 pilots (FC) would make so many fatal mistakes."

"Notice the sequence of events that caused this plane to eventually crash near Athens on August 14th. The plane was a 737-300 and was in LNAV (lateral Navigation) VNAV (Vertical Navigation) and the altitude alerter was set to 34,000. The autopilot performed as it was supposed to until the electrical power failed due to fuel starvation. The pilots (FC) and everyone else were unconscious and I presume dead by the time this all happened and the plane entered a graveyard spiral and quickly thereafter impacted the planet Earth in Greece."

"The two pilots (FC) ignored the cabin altitude warning siren, MASTER WARNING, cabin pressurization RED Light and the Oxygen masks dropped and they thought it was the Takeoff Configuration Warning (Were you on the runway, you IDIOT!!) and the Captain (FC) called Maintenance Control and was out of his seat busily trying to pull the Circuit Breaker (C/B) to silence the horn. The First Officer (FC) didn't speak his language (German) and neither of them spoke English enough to communicate with each other; but, hey, I'll bet they worked CHEAP!!!"

"Just for the record and to make things crystal clear, the pilots (FC) have an oxygen system which is *entirely* separate and a completely different design than the oxygen system which is provided for passengers and flight attendants (CA). In addition, flight attendants have access to portable, emergency, oxygen bottles, located around the cabin in various lockers to be used, for example, when fighting fires and smoke. The bottom line is that the pilots (FC) (using no supplemental oxygen at any time) probably lapsed into unconsciousness first. Then the passengers would follow 30 minutes later, since that is the certified amount of time their kind of masks will provide oxygen. Finally, the flight attendants (CA) would be last, since they would have supplemental oxygen bottles to breathe from after their 'passenger-style' oxygen was all used up. All three categories would, in order, simply lapse into unconsciousness, like fainting or going to sleep at some point. Some minutes later - while still unconscious - their hearts would simply give out due to oxygen deprivation - and die *painlessly*, since they were still "asleep" in a manner of speaking. Hours would pass while the fuel was all used up. Though the plane certainly made a loud bang and a big hole when it hit the ground, all the people inside had died a long time earlier. And there would be little or no fire."

"The "only" way both pilots (FC) could be incapacitated, via hypoxia - lack of oxygen - would be if the First Officer/Copilot (FC) "failed" to manually open the oxygen bottle's valve prior to flight as he is certainly supposed to do. This oxygen bottle is located on his side, the extreme right side of the cockpit and far away from the Captain's (FC) visual or manual access. Otherwise, if the oxygen bottle valve *was* open, even if one pilot (FC) somehow screwed up during some pressurization emergency, the other (FC) would still continue to have access to oxygen - and remain alive - and fly the plane. That's why the valve being closed was the only answer. Some passenger cabin air IS recirculated, but only back into the passenger cabin, not into the cockpit. The cockpit gets "new" air in almost all cases, unless that 737-300 model is different than other 737's. Of course, in addition to that setup scenario-fault, a pressurization problem would also have to occur. If a rapid, high altitude depressurization took place (very rare, but possible), and if both pilots (FC) "believed" the valve had been opened - as it should have, they might then don their masks and righteously "assume" they were getting oxygen, but in fact were not. Without the valve open, they were getting only ambient air - at ambient (high altitude) air pressure into their oxygen masks. That is useless and won't sustain consciousness - or life - at 35,000 feet. At that altitude, you might have 30 seconds of useful consciousness - or even much less, depending upon your age and fitness and the rate of depressurization. IF neither of the pilots (FC) discovered in that short amount of time they were "not" getting oxygen for some reason - and retained the presence of mind to check (and then open) the valve on the bottle, they're cooked. Toast. End of story."

"Even that scenario is a bit of a stretch for multiple reasons; not least of which because the default "standby" switch position on each pilot's (FC) Oxygen Control Panel is always to have 100% oxygen selected (as opposed to a mixture of oxygen and ambient air, as necessary and the percentage of which depends upon measured cabin altitude.) With oxygen panel controls (a separate one exists for each pilot (FC)) set properly, if the oxygen valve itself were "closed," each pilot (FC) would not be able to 'draw' or breathe air while their oxygen masks were on. The mask would be sealed and nothing would get in; even ambient air. In the event of a pressurization emergency, the first pilot (FC) to get his mask on would instantly start yelling about 'opening that damned valve!' as their automatic response. In any case, each mask *should* be tested on the ground, prior to a flight. That also would be another huge 'clue' to the pilots (FC) that the valve was still closed. So, the only theoretical explanation to explain what happened seemed flawed, too. Another plausible reason could exist - since pilots would catch any other kind of failure, wouldn't they?

But, obviously, a valve left closed was "not" THE cause in this case. The 'setup' for the accident was faulty maintenance. OK that happens - and is not all that rare. Pressurization problems happen. Maintenance people (MT) sometimes make mistakes, but the pilots(FC) are paid well to detect and correct such errors in 'real time' - at any time. It so happens that I had an extremely similar thing happen to me when taking off from Los Angeles one day. As I was passing through about 5,000 feet, I somehow "sensed" that the airplane was not pressurizing properly. I'm no genius or clairvoyant, so I'm not bragging, but it just didn't "feel" right, so I looked up at the cabin pressurization gauges overhead and saw the cabin altitude was the same as our airplane's altitude; and there was no pressure differential building between inside and outside of the airplane. So, I immediately requested a 'level off' altitude at 5,000 feet. The Altitude Warning Horn never got to sound off. No red lights lit. No masks dropped. No emergency took place. We took action *before* reaching 10,000 feet! We cruised around off shore, talked with our Los Angeles maintenance people (MT), took some corrective actions to correct a maintenance screw up, and the plane started pressurizing as it was supposed to. And we then climbed and flew on to our destination. No biggie. I doubt our passengers ever knew anything was going on."

"The pilots are the "last line of defense" against (among other things) stupidity and human error, starting with those of other people, but including 'trapping' their own errors before they become serious problems. The TRUE cause of the accident was that *both* pilots (FC) were brain-dead STUPID. They didn't understand how their airplane works, what the warning systems were trying to tell them, and did not perform their essential function!! They started working on the solution before they really had identified the problem! Egad! I wonder how they ever completed transition training to fly that airplane - and how the Captain (FC) ever passed his "Type Rating" checkride, to fly as Pilot-in-Command (FC) of that type of aircraft!!!"

"It doesn't matter what model of jet airplane you fly; ANY TIME you hear the cabin altitude warning go off (regardless of what kind of sound and/or warning lights turn on), EVERY emergency checklist is going to have as it's first, #1 Action: "Put on your oxygen mask." Period. Everything else is secondary!! We are all trained, just like Pavlov Dogs, to react instantly and without any decision-making at all required when certain, critical things, like that, occur. It never dawned on either of them that they NEEDED oxygen. Duh! Where was "their" training? Yes, the horn used to warn the pilots (FC) about not having their flaps, speed brakes, wheel brakes, and a few other things set "properly" for takeoff - is the same one that is used to warn the pilots (FC) that the cabin altitude is too high (meaning that air pressure is too low) when such a condition is sensed by the airplane's pressure sensors. But that is NO excuse for this level of confusion. If it's a "Takeoff Warning" the intermittent horn is trying to alert, that kind of problem will *only* occur on the ground. At which time, the pilots (FC) are supposed to do certain things. But if it's a "cabin altitude" problem, (which is to say a pressurization fault) they are supposed to do different things. Pressurization problems can only take place while airborne and will "never" take place on the ground. BUT you'd have to be a complete IDIOT to confuse the two, different, possible meanings that one horn is trying to tell you (as the article points out).

But I still find it impossible to believe that the pilots would be able to continue climbing to such an altitude to where they'd lose consciousness (somewhat above 20,000' I assume, which would take several minutes to reach) AFTER their first warning, when the plane climbed through 10,000 feet. Doing a 'Wild Goose Chase' around the cockpit, pursuing bogus 'faults' and pulling circuit breakers should certainly stop, if not sooner, at least at 14,000! I'll tell you why.

The pilots (FC) can *command* the passenger oxygen masks to drop at any time they choose; even while on the ground! Just throw one switch and it'll happen. Regardless of that, if the cabin altitude gets to 14,000 feet, the masks will drop *automatically* in the passenger cabin, due to an automatic, built-in pressure sensor set to trigger then. (Nothing extra happens in the cockpit as they pass that altitude.) The very next thing that will happen in the Real World is that the flight attendant/stewardess (CA) is going to be wildly dinging the cockpit crew with the interphone chime to find out just what the hell is going on and why did the masks all dropped, and what the pilots (FC) are doing about it, and do they want their coffee now? When the (CA) tells the Captain (FC) that the masks have all dumped in the back of the airplane, even a MONGOLOID Captain (FC) would then know he's got a serious pressurization problem, not some 'takeoff warning' that won't shut off!

For that matter, the Captain (FC) could have easily trouble-shot the probem to confirm which reason the horn was going off - by pressing one button. The 'Altitude Warning' horn *can be silenced* by pressing a 'cutoff' button on the overhead panel. But that button has no effect on a 'takeoff warning'. The only way to silence a 'takeoff warning' horn is by fixing the source of the problem.

I never believed a flight crew (FC) could be SO ignorant as to ignore a RED 'Cabin Altitude' emergency annunciator light, assume a cabin altitude horn is malfunctioning, and to ignore or fail to check the Pressure Differential, Cabin Altitude, AND the altitude Rate-of-Change gauges, which are pneumatic, direct-reading, and bona fide 'no shit' gauges that ALWAYS work, and always tell the truth, even without electrical power!

This German (an ethnic group with a well-deserved reputation for engineering and scientific intelligence) and his ESL Co-Star (FC) hit a new cumulative low on the IQ scale. I'm just sorry that all those people had to be with them when the pilots (FC) left their brains at home that day."

Affordable hypoxia awareness training for flight crew (FC) is about to become available through a system the USA Navy (USN) has developed to replace costly decompression-chamber simulations.

A lack of similar systems is believed to have been instrumental in accidents such as the 14 August Helios Airways (HCY) crash in Greece. The pilots (FC) in this instance were unable to recognize the symptoms associated with the onset of hypoxia ¨C low blood oxygen levels ¨C which occurs in the event of de-pressurization or failure to pressurize.

Demonstrating the equipment at a Bombardier Safety Stand down seminar in Wichita, Kansas, the USA Navy's, Captain Donna Murdock showed nearly 500 delegates what happens as a pilot (FC) carries out tasks on a PC-based flight simulator while being fed air at ground-level pressure, but with a reduced proportion of oxygen in it to simulate high-altitude conditions.

The equipment, known as a reduced oxygen breathing device (ROBD), controls the percentage of oxygen in the air supplied to a pilot (FC) wearing a face mask.

Air is around 21% oxygen, 78% nitrogen and 1% other gases, but the (ROBD) can control the proportion of oxygen in the air supplied to the mask to simulate the degenerative cognitive and physical co-ordination effects on pilots of the reduced partial pressure of oxygen at any altitude.

The (ROBD) can also measure pilots blood oxygen levels and heart rate while they are given tasks, which could include using a joystick and desktop computer running a flight-simulator program. Murdock demonstrated how this can be videoed and shown to pilots after their training so they can see how easy it is to lose the ability to make decisions before they realize they have a hypoxia problem and in the real case don their cockpit oxygen masks to counteract the danger.

The equipment is produced under licence from the USA Navy by Connecticut-based Environics, at a unit cost of about $26,000.

Other fatal crashes caused by pressurization failure followed by hypoxia include a Beech Super King Air in Australia in 2000, and a Bombardier Learjet 35 (with golfer Payne Stewart on board) in the USA in 1999.

The final report on the August 2005 crash of a Helios Airways (HCY) 737-300 near Athens, Greece details four active, and four latent failures that caused the accident, says Hellenic Air Accident Investigation and Aviation Safety Board Head, Akrivos Tsolakis.

The report says the accident occurred because the pilots (FC) became unconscious from hypoxia when the airplane did not pressurize during its climb out of Larnaca airport, Cyprus. Tsolakis lists the active failures as:

* failure of the flight crew (FC) to recognize during pre-start checks that the pressurization control panel master switch was set to manual rather than automatic;

* failure of the pilots(FC) to recognize the audible alert indicating that the airplane was not pressurizing as it climbed;

* flight crew (FC) unconsciousness resulting from hypoxia, leading to the loss of their ability to manage the flight;

* engine flame-out resulting from fuel exhaustion.

The airplane, on a 14 August 2005 charter flight to Athens with six crew (FC)/(CA) and 115 passengers, crashed at Grammatikos just short of its destination, killing everyone on board. Tsolakis says he has also identified four latent failures situations that predisposed the airplane to an accident at some time in the future as factors in the Helios (HCY) crash. These include:

* management and organizational deficiencies in the airline itself;

* inadequate exercise of airline safety oversight by Cypriot aviation authorities;

* failure by Boeing (TBC) to modify its pressurization control system, despite there having been numerous occurrences in which 737s failed to pressurize for similar reasons to those that caused the Helios (HCY) accident;

* the inadequate exercise of crew resource management (CRM) by the flight crew (FC), as the airline had not trained these pilots (FC) in (CRM) skills.

The chief investigator, aware that there has been considerable media debate in Cyprus about the fact that maintenance engineers left the pressurization control in the manual setting after conducting pressurization checks on the ground, said he does not consider that this was a causal factor in the accident.

September 2005: Helios Airways (HCY) said that its two 737-800s successfully completed safety checks in Sweden and reentered operations. "In-depth safety checks covered the major airplane systems, ensuring the full airworthiness of the airplanes," the charter airline stated.

October 2005: INCDT: A Helios Airways (HCY) 737-800 operating flight ZU402 from Larnaca to Dublin was forced to return to Larnaca because of an air-conditioning problem shortly after takeoff. The airplane circled over Paphos for nearly an hour to reduce its weight and made a safe landing at Larnaca around 19:30. An (HCY) 737-800 operating flight ZU566 from Larnaca to Glasgow was forced to return to Larnaca because of an air-conditioning problem similar to the one that forced an air-return 2 days earlier.

December 2005: Helios Airways (HCY) announced some new flights/routes it will operate for the winter season as follows:
Larnaca - Manchester = Sundays (January 15 to March 26);
Paphos - London (LGW) = Saturdays (February 11 to March 25);
Paphos - Manchester = Sundays (January 15 to March 26);
Paphos - Newcastle = Saturdays (January 14 to March 25);
All flights will be operated with 737-800s.

March 2006: Sabre Travel Network signed a multi-year, full-content agreement with SN Brussels Airlines (DAT). Meanwhile, four additional airlines upgraded their connections to Sabre: Aegean Airlines (CRM), Helios Airways (HCY), Yemenia Yemen Airways (YEM), and Afriqiyah Airways (AQY) now are participating at Direct Connect Availability, the "highest level of participation in the Sabre GDS," according to the company.

"Ajet" (HCY), the new name of "Helios Airways," was grounded by the Cypriot government as it was to begin low cost operations until liability issues are resolved.

1 order 737-8BK (33029, 5B-DCE), CIT Group (TCI) leased.

May 2006: 737-8BK (33029, 5B-DCE), (TCI) leased, with winglets (see photo).

September 2006: AJet Airways (HCY) is a Cypriot charter and scheduled airline, serving the leisure market.

(IATA) Code: ZU - 032. (ICAO) Code: HCY (Callsign - HELIOS).

Main Base: Larnaca International Airport (LCA).

Hub: Paphos International airport (PFO).

Domestic, Scheduled Destinations: Larnaca; & Paphos.

International, Scheduled Destinations: Athens; Birmingham; Bucharest; Dublin; Glasgow; London; Manchester; Newcastle; Nottingham; Prague; Sofia; Strasbourg; & Warsaw.

October 2006: The European Commission (EC) updated its list of airlines banned in the (EU), adding Kenya's DAS Air Cargo (DAC) and Uganda's Dairo Air Services (DAR), due to "the serious safety deficiencies identified in these twin airlines in the last few months," as well as Ariana Afghan Airlines (AFG). The (EC) also banned all 27 companies certified in Kyrgyzstan Kyrgyz Air (KYR), owing to "the national control authority's inability to supervise them effectively."

Sixty-eight carriers - - 19 from the Democratic Republic of Congo, 21 from Liberia, 18 from Sierra Leone, and 10 from Swaziland - - have been removed, as they ceased operating because they lost their Air Operator's Certificates (AOC)s. Eight recently created airlines in the (DRC) have been added. Air Services Comores (COM) of Comoros, previously banned outright, now is subject to operational restrictions, and will be allowed to operate services bound for Europe with an airplane recently fitted with appropriate safety equipment. The (EC) also decided to keep Phuket Air (PHK) and Air Koryo (KOY) on the list.

The (EC) and the member states' aviation safety experts examined six other individual cases, including Pulkovo Aviation (STG), Pakistan International Airways (PIA), Ghana's Johnsons Air (JON) and Ajet (HCY) (the former Helios Airways). It concluded that it did not consider an immediate banning measure was called for on the basis of air safety criteria, but stated that it will "be keeping a watchful eye" on those operators' implementation of the corrective action they and their respective national authorities have promised.

November 2006: Libra Holidays Group (LHG), the CSE listed travel and air group, announced that its subsidiary, Ajet Aviation Ltd (HCY), formerly "Helios" will cease its airline operations in the next three months.

The Board of Ajet (HCY) decided to suspend its airline operations in the next three months and decide at a later stage how to offload the two leased airplanes that it operates. Legal sources nevertheless insist that the closure does not affect the legal obligations of the group to the relatives of the Helios (HCY) air tragedy.

(HCY) was also under safety concerns scrutiny by the European Commission (EC) and even though the airline has not been banned from flying in the (EU), yet Cyprus has come under criticism for its lax controls on regulating the safety aspects of the troubled airline.

(HCY), which operates a trio of 737-800s, made the decision based on financial considerations, however, in the meantime, the Cyprus Transport Minister forced the grounding of the airline 2 days ago. There are doubts whether (HCY) will operate any more flights.

737-8BK (33029), returned to CIT (TCI).

October 2014: See video "Helios Airways (HCY) 737 ACCIDENT 2005-08" -

A nine year later review???????

Fleet:
(definitions)

Click below for photos:
HCY-737-86N
HCY-737-8BK
HCY-AJET-737-800

October 2016:

0 737-31S (CFM56-3C1) (2982-29099, /98 5B-DBY "OLYMPIA"), EX-(DBA), DEUTSCHE STRUCTURED FINANCE LSD 2004-04. W/O 2005-08. 136Y.

0 737-4Y0 (CFM56-3) (1824-24682, /90, "ATHENA" 5B-DBG), EX-(FUA), (GEF) LSD 2000-06, RTND 2001-03, LST (HGA).

0 737-8BK (CFM56-7B) (1946-33029, 5B-DCE (SEE PHOTO)), (TCI) LSD 2006-05. WITH WINGLETS. RTND 2006-11. 189Y.

2 737-86N (CFM56-7B26) (790-30806, /01 5B-DBH "ZELA;" 829-30807, /01 5B-DBI "BENI"), (GEF) LSD. 189Y.

Management:
(definitions)

GEORGE ZENON MOUSKAS, CHAIRMAN.

SHAUN DEWEY, MANAGING DIRECTOR, EX-AIR MANOS (2000-11).

FREDERIC PANTILLON, FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANAGER.

KYRIACOS PILAVAKIS, TECHNICAL MANAGER (2001-09).

ELIAS THEMISTOCLEOUS, GROUND OPERATIONS MANAGER.

GEORGE PAVLIDES, FINANCE MANAGER.

KAREN SWITZER, COMMERCIAL MANAGER.

ANDREAS CHRISTODOULIDES, SALES & MARKETING MANAGER.

NICHOLAS ANASTASSIADES, EUROPEAN SALES & MARKETING MANAGER.

 
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